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Dear Readers,

In reading through this semester's submissions, I am convinced yet again of the strength of the intellectual, artistic, and spiritual community of the University of Dallas. While our selected works are distinct in content and voice, they witness to the wholeness characteristic of liberal education, and participate in the deepest human conversations that great texts express. The editors for this semester's *Scholar* were pleased to find a mirroring of the Core's progression in the selections. Antonette Gallo takes up the *Iliad* with an insightful analysis of Homer's heroic ideal in his portrayal of Hektor, showing the tension of loyalties within the human struggle. Zachary Willcutt delves into the philosophical origins of Kant, and shows the importance of recognizing the conversations that exist among the works of great thinkers. In a similar manner, Rachel Pauletti analyzes Russell Kirk's understanding of Tocqueville, the thinker read in *Principles of American Politics*. Alex Taylor's piece on Chesterton further confirms the importance of the dialogues that exist among thinkers, showing how Chesterton's interpretations of Saints Thomas Aquinas and Francis of Assisi open up a deeper understanding of the traditions of Christianity. Our identity as a Catholic university is therefore celebrated in these selections, as in Matthew McKowen's poem on human nature and salvation.

The contributions intelligently and artistically take up the great questions of human experience. Vallery Bergez, in her Sorensen Award winning essay on Marilynne Robinson's *Housekeeping*, deals with the power of narrative to create completeness, to reconcile the fragments of human existence through storytelling. Theresa Sawczyn's poem on an American World War II monument in France shows awareness of history and reverence for those whose sacrifices enable our pursuit of truth. Thomas Farris and Margaret Dostalík take up the universal topics of loss and the human effort to make sense of pain in their beautiful, though widely different poems. And calling to mind the influence of our Rome Program, Luke Pecha beautifully depicts the *Fontana dei Quattro Fiumi*.

Finally, the pursuit of truth is illustrated not only in the arts but also in the physical and life sciences, as in Michael Hoff's scientific exploration on particle interaction and in Madeleine Ielmini's research on genetic disorders.

All of the contributions speak to the astounding effort of a liberal

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**“Wild Strawberries”:  
Craving Wholeness in Robinson’s *Housekeeping***  
By Vallery Bergez

In her critical essay, “Framing the Past,” Laura Barrett argues that, by

mous afternoon, even when we are asleep, and even when we are so old that our thoughts have abandoned other business? What are all these fragments for, if not to be knit up finally? (92)

Memories may be fragmented, but Ruth envisions a final end of memory. The product of Ruth's search for unity, for a final "knitting up," is the narrative itself. By writing her own narrative, Ruth willingly places herself in a vulnerable position. The first-person narration implies Ruth's active choice to tell her story. At first, she assumes a very reporter-like voice, seemingly detached and unemotional: "My name is Ruth," she writes. "I grew up with my younger sister, Lucille, under the care of my grandmother, Mrs. Sylvia Foster, and when she died, of her sisters-in-law, Misses Lily and Nona Foster, and when they fled, of her daughter, Mrs. Sylvia Foster" (3). While the distance of her voice in these opening lines could, at first read, denote an unwillingness to be open with her reader, I would argue that it reflects the difficulty of entering into such an intimate relationship. By immediately divulging her background information, Ruth acquaints the reader with fundamental past experiences, a necessary foundation for the deep relationship that builds through the remainder of the novel.

Within these introductory pages, Ruth sets the backdrop for her narrative. She relates tragic events of the Foster family, to which she alludes throughout the



woman” (163). Ruth reiterates that, though the lake is full of death, the absence of life, it summons thought and memory. Her mother lies dead beneath the lake’s surface, but she is present in Ruth’s memory. In a way, the lake manifests “the life of perished things” (124), as a constant reminder of death and a constant instigator of meditation on death, which almost animates the dead within her narrative. Somehow, by drawing Ruth’s attention downwards (i.e., to the death that lies beneath it), the lake draws her attention to something beyond her, and Ruth’s language brings the reader’s attention to the same place.

In the third narrative style, Ruth draws the reader into her consciousness through her hyper-meditative language. These meditations take the reader out of narrative time, as Ruth becomes highly mystical. Her voice conveys a connection between her past experiences and her present thoughts. When she tells the story of the night she and Lucille spent on Fingerbone’s lake, Ruth reflects on her experience with darkness:

I simply let the darkness in the sky become coextensive with the darkness in my skull and bowels and bones. Everything that falls upon the eye is apparition, a sheet dropped over the world’s true workings ... [O]ne is left with dreams that these specters loose their hf 6





Ruth frames Lucille by giving her an ending, though it is an imaginary one. She ties up the last loose end of her memories. Lucille is stuck, waiting in a restaurant; Ruth has no perimeters (219). Lucille embraces the power

## **The Dichotomy of a True Hero**

By Antonette Gallo

Homer recounts the lives of countless heroes throughout his epic poem, the *Iliad*. Most of these valiant men desire one thing above all else: <sup>1.</sup> While Hektor, the champion of the Trojans, also covets this glory, his soul is not entirely focused on this desire. Because of his yearning for his family, Hektor's inclination is dually-focused. The dichotomy of familial and militaristic life in Hektor's character reveals his uncommon heroism. His dual nature is perfectly illustrated through his interactions with his wife, Andromache in Book VI of the *Iliad*.

The setting of Hektor and Andromache's conversation suggests Hektor's distinctive heroism. As Hektor walks through Troy in Book VI, he counsels his mother, Helen, and other Trojan women. However, Andromache is at the forefront of his mind. As he searches for her, Homer writes, he "in speed made his way to his own established dwelling, / but failed to find in the house Andromache" (6.370-371). Distressed at not finding his wife and child at home, Hektor, at the guidance of a serving woman, begins to search for her out by the gates to the plain. As Hektor vigilantly pursues her, Homer narrates, "...he had come to the gates...whereby he would issue into the plain, there / at last his own generous wife came running to meet him, / Andromache" (6.392-395). As Hektor and Andromache have their revealing conversation, Homer physically places Hektor halfway between the city and the plain's gates, repmM



*Fountain of Four Rivers: Nile and Amazon*  
**Robert Pecha**  
**Graphite**  
**2014**

**Charging and interaction of two-particle system within a glass box immersed in a low-vacuum argon plasma**

By Michael Huff

Abstract

Due to Debye screening, the interaction between charged dust particles within a plasma may not be considered as a simple Coulomb force. In order to observe particle-particle interaction, the top particle in a vertical, two-particle



To see the Living Army rising from the waves-  
The struggle over, the battle done,  
Our mission accomplished and our war won-  
To soar with strength and glory to the sun.”







defend this contention, despite its laying much of the groundwork for the Critique. It is left open for the reader to affirm or to deny. If the reader denies it, the rest of the Critique will rest on an uncertain if not a false premise. The remainder of the paragraph immediately following this initial statement is not an argument for the statement itself, but a clarification and explanation thereof. Kant describes in particular what his first statement means, that the consciousness is called into activity by particular objects encountered in the perceived world that produce representations while also simultaneously activating mental processes regarding such representations, ending in the production of a knowledge of objects that is experience. Knowledge does not exist apart from experience; the conscious individual only becomes conscious of knowledge with experience, when it is initially encountered. The subject never has knowledge without objects of knowledge, without experience; the subject is never conscious without being conscious of a thing, of an object, which is encountered in experience. Knowledge does not ap-

the subject. He rejects such theorizing on the basis of the way in which knowledge is primordially encountered – arising with experience, alongside experience, and not independent of experience, contradicting Descartes, who begins by discarding all propositions that contain any doubt, “by casting aside all that admits of the slightest doubt, not less than if I had discovered it to be absolutely false” (*Meditations*, 79). Among that which is doubtful, consequently, is the evidence of sensation: “I suppose...that all the things which I see are false (fictitious)” (M, 79). All qualities, characteristics, and natures associated with experience are held as being only “fictions of my mind” (M, 79). Consciousness is therefore separated from that of which it is conscious, that which is encountered in experience. For there must surely exist an I that is persuaded that there is nothing real in order for there to be a persuasion of the falsity of the experienced world, such that “Doubtless...I exist, since I am deceived” (M, 80). The act of being deceived assumes the existence of a deceived subject, the I. Descartes proceeds to consider his own I, as a consciousness of being deceived. He is conscious that he is something, a being deceived, and he will therefore never imagine himself to be nothing. For him to be conscious that he is something, though, is for him to be conscious of himself; consciousness has been reflected back upon itself. Since he maintains that the experienced world is dubious, then, he is examining the conscious subject qua conscious subject. The Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* isolates the subject by itself, apart from its experiences, in a tendency that is wholly foreign to it. Knowledge is detached from its object that comes in experience, i.e., knowledge loses its character as coming into consciousness alongside objects empirically given. If the subject returns to its own experience, it never can recall having had knowledge absent empirical givens; there universally at every moment of consciousness is the presence of experience, about which there is knowledge, which is not encountered without the simultaneous objects of experience. Cartesian Rationalism, in its deconstruction of the tendency in which the subject has knowledge, as the very result of this deconstruction, is unable to provide an experientially adequate account of knowledge, as it begins with artificial premises that lock the consciousness reflectively in its own self.

However, Kant also does not simply fall into Empiricism; for the opening claim of *The Critique* is qualified by “it does not follow that [knowledge] arises from experience,” which again reveals a phenomenological method. That knowledge begins with experience does not therefore indicate that experience causes knowledge in itself substantially, that is, knowledge is not so much generated by experience as it is activated by such or is the combination of the data thereof with concepts furnished from the understanding. *The Critique* refuses to take the unjustified leap from the proposition that knowledge is only encountered in and with experience to the claim that knowledge arises from experience, i.e., it is reducible to sensation, as Locke maintains in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*: “In [experience] all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself” (HU, 53). Observation, of either “external sensible objects” or “the internal

operations of...[the] mind” “supplies our understandings with all the materials of

there is a raw material of sensible impressions; therefore, he is not using the phenomenological method as such, he having posited something more than what is given in lived experience.

This objection, though, is insufficient to reject that *The Critique* in its beginning employs the phenomenological method as its general approach, upon the grounds of two separate reasons. The first is that taken simply, the Critique appeals to ‘experience,’ the basic experience of the person in his own life. By consulting his own experience, he will assent to the validity of the claim that all knowledge arises with experience, with an object. Similarly, Husserl starts with ‘lived experience,’ stating that a phenomenon, an object, is “something having...those determinations with which it presents itself in consciousness,” that is, how it is experienced (SW, 12). The difference is nominal; these terms both refer to the same totality: the conglomeration of particular concrete events that compose the situations encountered by consciousness as its life, its experience, flows before it (LI, 561). From the starting point of basic experience, Kant draws the conclusion that knowledge is only given with experience, that is, with an object; similarly, from the starting point of lived experience, Husserl, maintains that consciousness is always consciousness of a thing, never stripped of objects of which it is conscious (SW, 23). Implicitly, though, this indicates that knowledge, being an entity that exists within consciousness, which itself only arises with lived experience and the objects thereof, also must have an object and arise with experience. Kant and Husserl both agree upon this basic Kantian Transcendental and phenomenological initial point of reference for their respective investigations.

The second reply to the counter-argument that the Kantian understanding of perception is not phenomenological is that *The Critique* does not claim that humans in lived experience actually encounter the raw sense object; instead, Kant is referring to the physical act of sense-perception, not consciousness of the encountered world, of which the body of the subject is a part. With respect to the corporeal generation of the percepts of entities in space and time, there is indeed raw sense data, which enters into the subject by physical senses, sensation; such is then reproduced in the imagination as an image; and finally ends in being endowed with a concept in the understanding, by which an entity becomes recognized (CPR A125). Only the latter category, though, constitutes physical objects as they are encountered in the world; that is, meaningfully, in consciousness, having already been acted upon when the conscious subject becomes conscious of them in the understanding (CPR A125). Here Kant foreshadows the noesis, the rays of attention always already going out to the object, the noema, as it is encountered by consciousness, as described later by Husserl. Therefore, transcendental idealism and phenomenology do more than coincide in their methods; the former goes so far as to prefigure the latter, since both are grounded in the analysis of the stream of conscious experience as it presents itself to the subject, that is, consciousness and knowledge arising with experience.

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#### **The Role of *GRK4* in Bladder Exstrophy-Epispadias Complex**

Madeleine Ielmini

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#### **ABSTRACT**

The object of this research was to identify the effects of G Protein-Coupled Receptor kinase 4 (*GRK4*) gene mutations found in Bladder Exstrophy-Epispadias Complex (BEEC) patients on protein function by measuring cyclic AMP (cAMP) levels of cells containing mutated *GRK4* transcripts. BEEC is a congenital anomaly of the urinary tract that occurs for 1 in 20,000 to 80,000 births<sup>1</sup>. However, in families with a previous occurrence of BEEC, the incidence is 1 in 100 births<sup>2</sup>, a significant increase over the population incidence, indicating a possible genetic factor. Analysis of array Comparative Genomic Hybridization (aCGH) results from a BEEC patient population revealed a patient with a microduplication encompassing the (*GRK4*) gene. Copy number variations (CNVs) of *GRK4* are rare in the general population, with a frequency of 0.162% (<https://decipher.sanger.ac.uk>). Ten patients with urological defects, mainly of the kidney and bladder, were identified as having CNVs containing *GRK4*. The low frequency of CNVs containing *GRK4* and their association with urological defects makes *GRK4* a promising candidate for study. *GRK4* is one of six members of a G proteinR





religion according to Kirk, the greatest prop to order is “to encourage and shelter individual differences, variety of character,” and that “high human striving” that set individuals apart (Kirk 193).

Kirk’s deep love of Edmund Burke skews his vision regarding Tocqueville. Kirk, although he esteems Tocqueville, still considers him a

he fixes his gaze upon those material enjoyments which can grant him increasing comfort and can decrease his inconveniences. Rich and poor alike constantly see something more that could comfort them and they go about their lives in agitation, but not disorder. Thankfully, this pursuit of material enjoyments “needs order to be satisfied,” supports mores on account of their usefulness “to public tranquility and...industry,” and “comes to be combined with a sort of religious morality” (Tocqueville, *DA*, 2.2.11.509).

Still, a restlessness reigns in the soul of the American but not a wholly materialistic or Marxist restlessness. Rather, when the American mournfully declares “I have not that which I desire,” it echoes from a much deeper part of his soul. Tocqueville claims that this restlessness, or *inquietude*, can serve as a useful and not altogether bad means to a supremely high end, to a remarkable human striving. The desire for the sublime did not come from man but is inscribed in his very nature before he was born: he cannot help it. But upon sinking into a material *ennui*, his agitation pricks him to look upwards and he does so with an unmatched impetuosity.

“Uniformity is the death of high human striving,” says Kirk and even Tocqueville, for the most part, concurs (Kirk, 193). And yet, in bleakness of this materialistic America, Tocqueville discerns a wonder. Since all Americans concern themselves, almost wholly, with material

one's elders and those now dead. Man exercised his pity and piety under

ners of the democratic mind, which, although in some cases lack the artfulness and gravity of an aristocratic society, nevertheless are honest, plain, useful, and ultimately good. And Tocqueville loves them for that.

#### Notes

1. Tocqueville, *DA*, 2.2.8.502: “The doctrine of self-interest well understood...cannot by itself make a man virtuous; but it forms a multitude of citizens who are regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted, masters of themselves; and if it does not lead directly to virtue through the will, it brings them near to it insensibly through habits.”

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**Chesterton's Christian Metaphysics: Distinction and Creation  
in *St. Francis* and *St. Thomas***

By Alex Taylor

GK Chesterton wrote sketches of two different saints, *St. Francis of Assisi* in 1923 and *St. Thomas Aquinas* in 1933. Chesterton's portrayal sought to counter the romantic adoption of the former and the popular ignorance or else disdain of the latter; he did so by filling out his portraits with the Christian metaphysics that united the two saints in their work, a work they pursued in quite different ways, but a work that Chesterton asserts to be "the same work; the work that has changed the world" (425). Their work was the real Reformation of cleansing the stables of antiquity, purging the temples of Christendom of the smoke of paganism, through the rechristening of sun and moon as brother and sister in creation, and the baptism of Aristotle so as to conform him to Christ and rescue him from the blood red crescent flag. Their work was a real liberation, in that Francis freed Nature from her pagan and pantheist associations, in that Thomas freed the senses from the existential doubt of sight and smell. Their work was the real dawn of the fullness of the Christian metaphysical vision, which in distinguishing God from his creation, allowed creation to be seen



**“Regret in Triplicate”**

By Margaret Dostalik

I

No need of locks for envined gates curled shut  
Since none shall try the handle covered in shoots,  
And no one knows the words obscured that cut  
Its soft unlasting bolts, Who can hear those flutes  
That tremble dimly somewhere far away  
And swiftly pass, as a sinking maze of roots  
Fades into earth. My thoughts begin to fray,  
Snagged in vain on the nail of what is not  
And pulled by what is. Yet even so, I pray  
My mind won't snap adrift, however taut.  
Thus mad, I strive to weave a tighter knot.

II

They say that loss enkindles bright desire,  
Sails ships, inflames both blood and homes with fears  
Of loss renewed, that fevered pulsing fire  
Consuming all your rest with smoking tears  
Without regret. Resist it, deny the heart  
Such comfort. You cannot flee or fight these fears.  
As a birch withstands the aether's flashing dart,  
So you keep still while wind and water brawl  
Through twitching leaves. All things must die, must part.  
Be patient. Though loss within your bones may crawl  
—so hard to fight such grief—it too must fall.

III

When autumn wrapped in fading robes of green  
First lets them fall and shows her golden skin,  
Against my will I dream of how I'll keen  
If you are gone; here lies my darkest sin,  
My impiety—although I'm not your blood—which tears  
Itself to rags to mourn its only kin:  
That selfish still, I weep for my pain, my cares,  
And not for you, my mother. Did I leave to find  
Alluring phantoms which snatched my heart with snares?  
Yet I must keep down this path which used to wind  
Round sunny thoughts, but now stumbles blind.

